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LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
In addition to the parties named in the caption of the case on appeal, 
claimant Hank D. Lachman was served with the verified complaint and has 
answered and defended in this matter. (See Record 14). 
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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996) and Utah R. App. P. 3, 4. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to this Court for review: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the trial court's finding of fact that "the 
United States currency ... had been or was intended to be used by claimant 
Hank Lachman in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of the 
laws of the state of Utah..." was clearly erroneous in light of the stipulation 
between the parties that the currency that was seized and ultimately 
forfeited had not been traced to any drug transaction in or out of the state of 
Utah. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the trial court's finding that the 
warrantless search of claimant Hank Lachman's trunk and the seizure of the 
currency by the Utah Highway Patrol Officers was proper, was correct. 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the Utah Forfeiture Statute violates 
claimant Hank Lachman's protections from excessive fines under the Utah 
and/or United States Constitutions. 
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ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the Utah Forfeiture Statute violates 
claimant Hank Lachman's equal protection and due process rights under the 
Utah and/or United States Constitutions. 
ISSUE NO. 5: Whether depositing the seized currency into a bank 
account constitutes spoliation of evidence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
FIRST ISSUE: The standard of review of a trial court's findings of 
fact is whether the findings "are against the clear weight of the evidence, 
thus making them clearly erroneous." State v. One 1984 Oldsmobile, 892 
P.2d 1042, 1043 (Utah 1995). 
SECOND ISSUE: The standard of review regarding whether a 
warrantless seizure was permissible is reviewed for correctness, granting no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions. State v. One Hundred Seventy-
Five Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars, U.S. Currency, 942 P.2d 343, 346 
(Utah 1997). 
THIRD ISSUE: Constitutional questions regarding seizure of 
currency are questions of law to be reviewed for correctness, granting no 
-2-
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deference to the trial court. State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand 
Eight Hundred Dollars, U.S. Currency, 942 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1997). 
FOURTH ISSUE: Constitutional questions regarding seizure of 
currency are questions of law to be reviewed for correctness, granting no 
deference to the trial court. State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand 
Eight Hundred Dollars, U.S. Currency, 942 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1997). 
FIFTH ISSUE: Whether the spoliation doctrine is recognized in the 
state of Utah is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness, granting no 
deference to the trial court's decision. State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five 
Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars, U.S. Currency, 942 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 
1997). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR 
RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are determinative 
of the issues on appeal: 
S ta tu tes 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (1996). 
-3-
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Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
U.S Const, amend. XIII. 
U.S Const, amend. XIV. 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 14 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 9. 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 24. 
These provisions are set forth in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT BELOW. 
The plaintiff, State of Utah, filed a verified complaint in rem seizure 
and forfeiture action on December 21, 1999. (R. 1-5). On January 3, 2000, 
claimant received at his home a notice from the United States Postal Service 
i 
that he had a certified letter at the local United States Post Office. (R. 148, 
193). Claimant Hank Lachman received by mail a copy of the complaint in 
this matter on January 4, 2000. (R. 148, 193). The envelope was { 
postmarked from Moab, Utah, December 30, 1999. (R. 148, 170, 193). On 
January 6, 2000, plaintiff entered a service by publication in The Times- f 
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Independent, published every Thursday in Moab, Grand County, giving 
notice to any claimants of the property seized that they had "twenty (20) 
days from the service of this notice upon you, within which to file a verified 
answer to the complaint on file herein ..." (R. 149, 180). 
On January 24, 2000, Defendant served the answer upon plaintiffs 
counsel by placing the answer in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and 
likewise mailed the verified answer to be filed with the Court. (R. 149). The 
Clerk of Court received the answer on January 26, 2000. (R. 14). 
Plaintiffs counsel filed an objection to the answer, claiming that it 
should have been filed with the Court by January 24, 2000. (R. 22-23). 
Claimant filed a motion for enlargement of time on January 31, 2000, along 
with a memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion for 
enlargement of time. (R. 24-33). Claimant's counsel never received a 
response from plaintiffs counsel regarding the motion for enlargement of 
time, and thus submitted a notice to submit the motion for enlargement of 
time. 
Claimant's counsel began to conduct discovery in this matter, taking 
the deposition of claimant, serving subpoena upon Utah Highway Patrol 
-5-
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Trooper Keith Wilson to appear at deposition and submitting a Rule 34 
request to inspect the evidence in this matter. (R. 42-44). 
Claimant's counsel received notice on January 31, 2000 from the Court 
that the Forfeiture Hearing would be held in the above matter on February 
23, 2000. Claimant filed a motion for summary judgment on February 22, 
1999. On February 22, 2000, plaintiff finally filed proof of service upon 
claimant, along with the Proof of Publication. (R. 48-49). 
Claimant's counsel came to the Forfeiture hearing prepared to present 
evidence and cross examine witnesses. (R. 150, 168). The Court however, 
indicated that it first wished to rule on claimant's motion for enlargement of 
time. (R. 120, 125). The Court wished to know from the parties when the 
complaint was mailed to claimant Hank Lachman. (R. 125). Plaintiffs 
counsel asserted that the complaint in this matter had been mailed to 
claimant on December 21, 1999. Claimant's counsel, having no notice that 
the Court wished to have oral argument on the motion for enlargement of 
time, was unable to present any evidence or speak with his client regarding 
when he received the complaint. (R. 126, 185-186). Claimant's attorney 
asked the Court for additional time to prepare supplemental evidence and 
-6-
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memoranda regarding when the complaint was actually mailed and received 
by claimant Hank Lachman. (R. 151, 186). 
At the hearing, the Court ruled from the Bench that the claimant was 
served with the complaint on December 21, 1999, that claimant's answer was 
thirteen days late, that the claimant's answer was untimely, that the motion 
for enlargement of time was denied and the answer would not be considered 
by the Court. (R. 127, 187). 
The Court also took the issue of whether the seized currency was 
otherwise forfeitable under advisement. (R. 187). At the hearing, the 
parties stipulated to undisputed facts to be submitted to the court in 
determining whether the currency was forfeitable. (R. 122-123). 
After the hearing on February 23, 2000, claimant's counsel requested 
that claimant provide him the envelope that the complaint had been mailed 
infromMoab. (R. 151, 166). Claimant Lachman had misplaced the 
envelope. (R. 194). 
On March 23, 2000, the trial court issued a memorandum decision, 
ruling that claimant's answer was untimely and would not be considered. 
(R.125-134). The trial court also ruled that: 1) the currency was received in 
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exchange for a controlled substance, or was intended to be exchanged for a 
controlled substance; 2) the seizure warrant that was issued seven days after 
the currency was actually seized was proper; 3) Claimant gave his consent to 
the UHP officers to search his trunk; and 4) The forfeiture did not violate the 
excessive fines clause of the U.S. Constitution. (R. 131-134). 
On March 28, 2000, Claimant Lachman located the envelope and 
mailed it immediately to counsel. (R. 194). The envelope demonstrated that 
the complaint was mailed from Moab on December 30, 1999. (R. 197). 
On April 5, 2000, the district court entered a for 
forfeiture order. (R. 135-36). The order was prepared by plaintiffs counsel 
without review from claimant's counsel. (R. 136). 
On April 10, 2000, claimant filed a notice of objection to forfeiture 
order. (R. 137). On April 14, 2000, claimant filed a motion for relief of the 
default judgment entered against him and to amend the forfeiture order. (R.
 ( 
144). Oral argument was held on May 17, 2000, whereby the parties 
stipulated that the claimant's answer was timely and that it would be 
considered by the trial court. (R. 212-214). The trial court also amended the 
forfeiture order. (R. 213-215). 
4 
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Based upon the stipulated facts presented to the trial court, claimant 
has appealed this ruling. (R. 221-223). 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: 
1. On or about December 13, 1999, claimant Hank D. Lachman was 
stopped and cited by Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Ken Ballantyne for 
speeding while traveling from his home in Los Angeles, California to Denver, 
Colorado on 1-70. (R. 55; 122). 
2. The next afternoon, on December 14, 1999, Mr. Lachman was 
pulled over for speeding by Trooper Keith Wilson on 1-70 in Grand County 
while heading back to California. (R. 55; 122) 
3. Mr. Lachman did not in any manner try to evade Trooper Wilson 
and was compliant in slowing down and pulling over when Trooper Wilson 
turned on his lights. (R. 55; 122). 
4. Mr. Lachman had a valid California driver's license. (R. 55; 122). 
5. Mr. Lachman was driving a rental car from Budget Rental car 
and was an authorized driver of the car. (R. 55; 122). 
6. Shortly after Mr. Lachman was pulled over, Trooper Ballantyne 
showed up and pulled along side Trooper Wilson's vehicle. (R. 55; 122). 
-9-
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7. Trooper Wilson believed that Mr. Lachman was acting very 
nervous and that his behavior was evidence that Mr. Lachman was under 
the influence of drugs. (R. 56; 122). 
8. Trooper Wilson's vehicle had no video camera inside of it. 
Trooper Ballantyne's vehicle was equipped with a video camera that is 
programed to turn on when his lights are turned on. (R. 56; 122). 
9. Trooper Wilson asked if they could search the vehicle. Mr. 
Lachman gave them consent to search the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle. (R. 56; 122). 
• • • • * • ' • " " • ' * ' ' • ' • • • • • 
10. Trooper Wilson interpreted Mr. Lachman's consent to search the 
passenger compartment to include the trunk and made no distinction 
between searching the passenger compartment and the trunk. (R. 56; 122). 
11. Trooper Ballantyne searched the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle. His search of the passenger compartment revealed no odor of 
marijuana, either in raw form or smoked, nor did the search find any drug 
paraphernalia, drug manufacturing equipment or any other controlled 
i 
substance or contraband. (R. 56; 122). 
r
- y • T • • • ' ' ; i 
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12. Trooper Wilson asked Hank Lachman how to open his trunk and 
Mr. Lachman showed Trooper Wilson where the trunk latch was located. (R. 
56; 122). 
13. Trooper Wilson asked Mr. Lachman if he could search his trunk 
and Mr. Lachman informed the Troopers and their superior Sargent 
Haycock, that he did not give them consent to search the trunk. (R. 56-57; 
122). 
14. Trooper Wilson opened the trunk anyway. (R. 57; 122). 
15. The Utah Highway Patrol Troopers did not at any time obtain a 
warrant to search the vehicle, nor did they have a drug sniffing canine. (R. 
57; 122). 
16. In the trunk was located a suit case, which Trooper Wilson 
searched without the consent of Mr. Lachman and without a warrant or a 
search dog. (R. 57; 122). 
17. In the suitcase, Trooper Wilson located some cigarette papers. 
(R. 57; 122). 
18. Hank Lachman is a smoker and rolls his own cigarettes and 
informed the UHP Troopers of such. (R. 57; 122). 
-11-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19. The cigarette papers were not seized by Trooper Wilson, nor 
were they considered to be drug paraphernalia or contraband. (R. 57; 122). 
20. Located in the trunk was also a Christmas package. (R. 57; 122). 
21. There was no drug paraphernalia, drug manufacturing 
equipment, narcotics, controlled substances or smell of marijuana in the 
trunk. (R. 57; 122). 
22. Finally, after the search of the vehicle had been conducted, 
Trooper Ballantyne turned on his video camera. (R. 57; 122). 
23. At this point in time, Trooper Wilson called Sargent Haycock and 
Sargent Haycock called Grand County Attorney William Benge to discuss 
what could be done with regards to the Christmas gift. Mr. Benge advised 
the UHP that there was not enough evidence to obtain a warrant to open the 
Christmas gift. (R. 58; 122). 
24. Mr. Lachman apparently initially denied any knowledge of the 
contents of the box. (R. 58; 122). 
25. Trooper Wilson asked Mr. Lachman if he would open the 
package or if they could open the package. Mr. Lachman told the Troopers 
-12-
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that he would not open the package and he did not consent to it being 
opened. (R. 58; 122). 
26. Sargent Haycock spoke with Mr. Lachman via cell phone and 
told him that if he would leave the package with the Troopers, that he would 
then be free to leave. (R. 58; 122). 
27. Mr. Lachman agreed to leave the package with the Troopers as 
long as he received a property receipt from them that was signed by Mr. 
Lachman, Trooper Wilson and Trooper Ballantyne. (R. 58; 122). 
28. Once Mr. Lachman was assured of having a property receipt for 
the package, his nervousness ended and he calmed down significantly. (R. 
58; 122). 
29. Once Mr. Lachman was assured of having a property receipt, he 
then revealed that he did know what was in the box and assured Sargent 
Haycock that there was nothing illegal or anything dangerous to his troopers 
to be found in the box. (R. 59; 122). 
30. Mr. Lachman was extremely nervous about having so much cash 
on hand and placed it in a Christmas box for safety purposes. (R. 59; 122). 
-13-
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31. Mr. Lachman knew that there was no controlled substances, no 
drug manufacturing equipment and no drug paraphernalia in the box. (R. 
59; 122). 
32. Once Mr. Lachman received the assurance that he would get a 
receipt, he felt comfortable that he would get the package back later. (R. 59; 
122). 
33. The receipt that was given to Hank Lachman lists Hank 
Lachman as the subject of the package. (R. 59; 122). 
34. The receipt maintained in the UHP files names Sam Scott as the 
owner of the package. (R. 59; 122). 
35. Even though Trooper Wilson originally believed that Mr. 
Lachman was under the influence of drugs or had something illegal in his 
car, Hank Lachman was not arrested for any violation of Utah law or 
otherwise given a traffic citation, but rather was given a "friendly contact" 
warning notice and was sent on his way home. (R. 59; 122). 
36. During the seizure procedure, Trooper Wilson placed the 
i 
package into his trunk without wrapping it or otherwise protecting it from 
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becoming corrupted by any drug residue that may be in his trunk. (R. 59; 
122). 
37. Trooper Wilson did not believe that there was anything 
dangerous about the package. (R. 60; 122). 
38. After Mr. Lachman drove off, Trooper Wilson took the package 
out of his trunk and opened it without a search warrant and observed that 
the package was filled with money. (R. 60; 122). 
39. After observing that the package was filled with money, Trooper 
Wilson did not pursue Mr. Lachman. (R. 60; 122). 
40. Trooper Wilson took the package and its contents back to the 
Moab UHP Post and opened the package and removed the contents with 
Sargent Haycock, without first obtaining a warrant. (R. 60; 122). 
41. The package contained $73,130 in cash. (R. 60; 122). 
42. It is not illegal to carry cash on one's person. (R. 60; 122). 
43. Trooper Wilson and Sargent Haycock found no detectable, 
collectable or forfeitable controlled substances on the currency or in the 
package materials. (R. 60; 122). 
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44. The currency was deposited into First Security Bank on the 
evening of December 14, 1999. (R. 60; 122). 
45. Two days later on December 16, 1999, two dogs alerted to the 
odor of narcotics on the packaging materials that contained the $73,130.00. 
(R. 60-61; 123). 
46. The amount or type of controlled substances that may have been 
sniffed by the dogs was not discernable or otherwise forfeitable. (R. 61; 123). 
46. The currency that was seized and which is sought to be forfeited 
in this case has not been traced to any drug transaction in or out of the state 
of Utah. (R. 61; 122). 
47. The complaint filed in this matter was served via certified mail 
upon claimant Hank Lachman, along with Sam Scott. (R. 61; 122). 
48. Mr. Lachman is the only person who filed a verified answer in 
this matter. (R. 61; 122). 
49. The only property that was being sought for forfeiture was the 
currency. The State of Utah did not attempt to seize and forfeit any of the 
i 
alleged traces of any controlled substance that was allegedly found on the 
packaging materials. (R. 61; 122). 
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50. A seizure warrant issued on December 21, 1999, seven days after 
the currency had been taken from Mr. Lachman and deposited by the Utah 
Highway Patrol into a bank account. (R. 7-8). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. I: The Utah seizure and forfeiture s ta tutes require that 
the State prove tha t the currency in question was intended to be used in 
exchange for a controlled substance. The parties stipulated before the trial 
court tha t the currency was not traceable to any drug transaction. Therefore 
the trial court's order tha t the currency was forfeitable was clearly 
erroneous. 
ISSUE NO. II: The parties stipulated before the trial court tha t 
Hank Lachman did not give the UHP consent to search his t runk. The UHP 
had no probable cause to, and no exigent circumstances justified, opening 
the trunk. Moreover, once the t runk was open, the U H P had no probable 
cause to, and no exigent circumstances justified, seizing the currency. Thus, 
the trial court had no jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the currency and the 
currency should be returned to claimant. 
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* ISSUE NO. Ill: The trial court's ruling acts as a fine of over $73,000 
to claimant Hank Lachman for a simple speeding warning. Such a result 
violates Mr. Lachman's protections against excessive fines under the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 9 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
ISSUE NO. IV: The differing burdens of proof between an in rem 
civil forfeiture and a forfeiture pursuant to a criminal action, violates 
claimant's equal protection and due process protections under both the Utah 
and U.S. Constitutions. 
ISSUE NO. V: Depositing the currency into a bank account prior to a 
seizure warrant issuing and before the claimant could inspect the currency, 
constitutes spoliation of evidence. As such, claimant is entitled to a 
presumption that the currency would have been beneficial evidence to him. 
Given such a conclusion, forfeiture was not justified. 
-18-
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This case is an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding. Utah civil seizure 
and forfeiture procedures are contained in a complex statutory framework 
found at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13. 
Before property can be seized for forfeiture proceeding, a warrant must 
first issue. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(3)(a). There are four exceptions to 
when a seizure may be made without process. The first exception is when 
the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant. Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(i). The second exception is when the property has 
been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal 
proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(ii). The third exception is 
when the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is 
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
13 (3)(a)(iii). The fourth exception is when "a peace officer has probable 
cause to believe that the property has been used in violation of the chapter 
and has probable cause to believe that the property would be damaged, 
intentionally diminished in value, destroyed, concealed, or removed from the 
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state." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(iv). If these requirements are not 
strictly complied with, the district court has no jurisdiction to order 
forfeiture. Davis v. State. 813 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1991). 
Once it is determined that a proper seizure occurred, then the state 
has the burden of proving to the trial court the following elements, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, before the property can be properly forfeited: 
1. that the person has engaged in conduct 
in violation of this chapter; 
2. that the property was acquired by the 
person during that period when the 
conduct in violation of this chapter 
occurred or within a reasonable time 
after that period; and 
3. that there was no likely source for the 
property other than conduct in violation 
of the chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (9)(c). 
Currency is treated differently from other property under the statute. 
The State is given a rebuttable presumption that "all moneys, coins, and 
currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug 
manufacturing equipment or supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or 
forfeitable records of importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled 
-20-
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substances are proceeds traceable to a violation of this chapter." Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-13 (2)(k). 
As discussed below, the trial court erred in finding that the currency in 
this matter was intended to be used by claimant in exchange for a controlled 
substance in violation of the laws of the state of Utah. Moreover, the search 
and seizure was without proper process. 
ISSUE NO. 1 
THE STIPULATED FACTS SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
PROHIBIT FORFEITURE IT IS STIPULATED TO AND 
UNDISPUTED BY ALL PARTIES THAT THE CURRENCY WAS NOT 
TRACED TO ANY DRUG TRANSACTION IN OR OUT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
The trial court ruled that the currency in this matter "had been or was 
intended to be used by claimant Hank Lachman in exchange for a controlled 
substance in violation of the laws of the state of Utah... ." (R. 215). This was 
clearly an erroneous finding by the trial court in light of the stipulation 
between the parties that the currency that was seized and ultimately 
forfeited had not been traced to any drug transaction in or out of the state of 
Utah. (R. 61; 122). 
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A; TRIAL COURT WAS BOUND BY STIPULATED FACTS 
BETWEEN PARTIES 
The trial court ruled that the proceeds were forfeitable by ignoring the 
stipulated facts between the parties. The trial court, in its amended order, 
ruled that "The United States currency described herein had been or was 
intended to be used by claimant Hank Lachman in exchange for a controlled 
substance in violation of the laws of the state of Utah." (R. 215). However, 
this finding is in direct contravention of the stipulated facts upon which the 
matter was submitted to the trial court. The parties stipulated that "the 
currency that was seized and which is sought to be forfeited in this case has 
not been traced to any drug transaction in or out of the state of Utah." (R. 
61; 122). It was further stipulated that it is not illegal to have cash on one's 
person. (R. 60; 122). 
The trial court ignored the stipulation in making this finding. 
However, "courts are bound by stipulations between parties." Adkins v. 
Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528, 536 (Utah 2000). As discussed below, without 
a showing by the State of Utah that claimant violated the Utah Controlled ! 
Substance Act, whether in or out of the state of Utah, plaintiff is not entitled 
to these proceeds. ( 
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B. FORFEITURE STATUTE REQUIRED STATE TO PROVE 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
EITHER IN STATE OF UTAH OR OUTSIDE THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
The Utah Legislature has defined what property is subject to 
forfeiture. "[N]o property right exists in ... all proceeds traceable to any 
violation of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (2)(k). "'Violation of 
this chapter' means any conduct prohibited by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 
37b, 37c, or 37d or any conduct occurring outside the state which would be a 
violation of the laws of the place where the conduct occurred and which 
would be a violation of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d if the 
conduct had occurred in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (g). 
1. STATE WAS UNABLE TO PROVE VIOLATION OF 
CHAPTER AND STIPULATED AS SUCH. 
The Utah Supreme Court has been very explicit that in order for a civil 
in rem forfeiture to occur, the State must show that the claimant to the 
money "intended to use the currency in his possession to produce, 
manufacture, distribute, or possess drugs..." in violation of the Utah 
Controlled Substance Act. State v. One, 892 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Utah 1995). 
Though the forfeiture statute has been amended since the One decision, to 
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include conduct outside of the state that would be a violation if it had 
occurred inside the state of Utah, the burden of the State has not changed to 
prove "that the money came from or was intended to be used in a drug 
transaction... ." In re One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency, 
823 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1992). 
The Utah Supreme Court decision of In re One Hundred Two 
Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency, had facts remarkably similar to the 
present case. A vehicle was stopped and the driver "was anxious to continue 
to a California destination." A search was conducted that discovered 
$100,900 in U.S. currency. A drug dog alerted on both the money and the 
packaging materials. No controlled substances were found in the vehicle or 
on the person, but Zigzag rolling papers were located. The driver had a valid 
driver's license, but did not own the vehicle he was driving. Charges were 
not filed against the driver or any of the passengers. Id. at 469. 
The trial court entered judgment of forfeiture based upon the fact that 
the currency had been intentionally hidden and the drug dog alerted on it. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State must prove that the 
money came from or was intended to be used in a drug transaction. As no 
-24-
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controlled substances were found in the van or on the person of any of the 
occupants and no criminal charges were filed against any of the occupants, 
the Supreme Court ruled tha t the State had not met "an element of 
forfeiture." Id. at 470. 
Similarly in One, 892 P.2d at 1042, the State of Utah sought to forfeit 
U.S. currency tha t was seized during a consensual search of a vehicle tha t 
had been pulled over for speeding. A drug dog "hit" on one of the stacks of 
currency. The Supreme Court ruled tha t forfeiture was not warranted, as 
the State "made no at tempt to prove tha t the money came from or was 
intended to be used in a drug transaction ..." Id. at 1045. The Court noted 
tha t no controlled substances were found in the car or on the person of the 
driver and no criminal charges were filed against the driver and tha t the 
"State's sole interest was in obtaining forfeiture of the money carried by [the 
driver.] Id. 
Similarly, in the present case, the trial court ruled tha t the currency 
was forfeitable, even though it was stipulated tha t "[t]he currency that was 
seized and which is sought to be forfeited in this case has not been traced to 
any drug transaction in or out of the state of Utah." (R. 61; 122). No 
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controlled substances were found on Mr. Lachman's person or in his vehicle. 
(R. 56; 122). No criminal charges were filed against him and he was only 
issued a "friendly" warning from the UHP. (R. 59; 122). The trial court's 
ruling that forfeiture was justified in this case was clearly erroneous, as 
there was no proof upon which the trial court could rely in finding the 
currency traceable to a drug transaction. 
2. STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO PRESUMPTION 
THAT PROCEEDS ARE TRACEABLE TO 
VIOLATION OF CHAPTER 
Given the stipulated fact that the currency was not traced to any drug 
transaction in or out of the state of Utah, it must be questioned if the trial 
court relied upon the rebuttable presumption found in Utah Forfeiture Act 
that "all moneys, coins, and currency found in proximity to forfeitable 
controlled substances, drug manufacturing equipment or supplies, drug 
distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable records of importation, 
manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances are proceeds traceable 
to a violation of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (2)(k). Though the 
trial court made no such explicit finding, any implicit reliance upon Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (2)(k) by the trial court was clearly erroneous. 
i 
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It is undisputed tha t there was no drug manufacturing equipment or 
supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable records of 
importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances found in 
proximity to the currency. (R. 56-59, 122). There was no controlled 
substances found in the passenger compartment, the t runk or on Hank 
Lachman's person. (R. 56-59, 122) 
Likewise, the trial court was not entitled to base its finding upon the 
canine sniff. Canine alerts do not entitle the state to claim the rebuttable 
presumption. See e.g. State v. One, 892 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1995) (fact tha t a 
dog hit on one of the stacks of currency indicating the presence of narcotics 
on the currency did not give rise to claim tha t rebuttable presumption 
applied). It is undisputed and stipulated tha t any traces of a controlled 
substance hit on by the canines was in such a small amount tha t it was not 
forfeitable. (R. 60, 122). There was only an odor of controlled substance, not 
an amount discernable enough to seize and forfeit.1 (R. 123). Utah Code 
1
 The fact that a dog hit on a package that contained a large amount of 
currency from the Los Angeles area, where claimant Hank Lachman resides (R. 
197), has no probative value to invoke this presumption. In United States v. U.S. 
Currency, $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 1994), the Court noted that: 
If greater than seventy-five percent of all circulated 
currency in Los Angeles is contaminated with drug 
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Ann. § 58-37-13 (2)(d) requires tha t the currency be found in proximity "to 
forfeitable controlled substances..." in order for there to be any reliance upon 
the rebuttable presumption. The complaint filed in this case is for forfeiture 
of the currency and not for any controlled substance. Thus, the rebuttable 
presumption has no application in this case, as the currency was not found in 
proximity to any forfeitable controlled substance. 
residue, it is extremely likely a narcotics detection dog 
will positively alert when presented with a large sum of 
currency from that area. Given this high degree of 
certainty, the probative value of a positive dog alert in 
currency forfeiture cases in Los Angeles is significantly 
diminished and'the continued reliance of courts and law 
enforcement officers on [such an alert] to separate 
legitimate currency from drug-connected currency is 
logically indefensible." (Citations omitted). 
Moreover, the actual currency was never sniffed, as it was deposited into a bank 
account the same day it was seized. (R. 60; 122). The fact that the packaging may 
have had an odor of controlled substance has no probative value as a contaminated 
bill can "go on to contaminate others as they pass through cash registers, wallets, 
and counting machines." Id. at 1042. In fact, in one survey: 
[o]f eight samples of cash taken from a police chief, a 
circuit judge, a state senator, a mayor, a community 
college president, the Orlando Sentinel editor, a reverend, 
and a county chairman, six out of the eight samples 
showed detectable amounts of cocain that were "well 
within the range of a drug dog's detection ability'" 
Id. at 1043. 
Furthermore, it has been stipulated to by both parties that during the seizure 
procedure, Trooper Wilson placed the package into his trunk without wrapping it or 
otherwise protecting it from becoming corrupted by any drug residue that may be in 
his trunk. (R. 59; 122). 
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C. STATE DID NOT MEET BURDEN OF PROOF FOUND IN 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-13 (9)(c). 
Apart from proving that the proceeds are traceable to a violation of the 
chapter, the trial court was required to find that the state had proven all of 
the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. that the person has engaged in conduct 
in violation of this chapter; 
2. that the property was acquired by the 
person during that period when the 
conduct in violation of this chapter 
occurred or within a reasonable time 
after that period; and r . 
3. that there was no likely source for the 
property other than conduct in violation 
of the chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (9)(c). 
As discussed above, the state did not try to prove that Mr. Lachman 
engaged in any conduct in violation of this chapter. (R. 61; 122). Mr. 
Lachman was not arrested or charged with any crime. (R. 59; 122). He was 
sent off with a friendly warning. (R. 59; 122). No attempt was made to 
ascertain when Mr. Lachman obtained the currency. The state did not 
attempt prove that there was no likely source for the property other than 
conduct in violation of the chapter. (R. 122-123). Thus, the trial court's 
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findings that the currency were proceeds of a drug transaction and were 
forfeitable were clearly erroneous. This Court should remand this matter 
back to the trial court with an order to return the currency, with interest and 
taxable costs. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. LACHMAN'S TRUNK AND 
SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF THE CURRENCY WAS IMPROPER 
Even assuming arguendo that the State did meet the elements 
necessary to forfeit the currency, it could only meet those elements after an 
improper search of Mr. Lachman's trunk and improper seizure of the 
currency. Thus, the search and seizure should be invalidated and the 
currency returned. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a) requires that property "may be seized 
by any peace officer of this state upon process issued by any court having 
jurisdiction over the property." No such process was issued to either search 
the trunk or to seize the contents of the Christmas package until December 
21, 1999, one week after the stop of Mr. Lachman. As such, the seizure is 
improper and the currency cannot be forfeited to the State. 
-30-
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Claimant Hank Lachman has standing to challenge the search and 
seizure of both his vehicle and the opening of the package. Mr. Lachman 
was a permissive driver of the Budget Rental Car. Moreover, he was given a 
property receipt by the UHP for the package that was taken. The County 
Attorney recognized Mr. Lachman's claim and served the complaint upon 
him. Thus, Mr. Lachman has standing. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 
463 (Utah 1990) ("standing would require at least a claimed right to 
possession in the property.") 
A. TRIAL COURT WAS BOUND BY STIPULATED FACTS 
BETWEEN PARTIES 
The trial court ruled in its amended order, that "the search of Hank 
Lachman's trunk by the Utah Highway Patrol Officers was done with Mr. 
Lachman's consent ... ." (R. 214). However, this finding is in direct 
contravention of the stipulated facts upon which the matter was submitted to 
the trial court. The parties stipulated that "Trooper Wilson asked Mr. 
Lachman if he could search his trunk and Mr. Lachman informed the 
Troopers and their superior Sargent Haycock, that he did not give them 
consent to search the trunk, but that Trooper Wilson opened the trunk 
anyway." (R. 56-57; 122). 
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Moreover, the trial court ruled in its amended order that seizure of the 
money in Hank Lachman's trunk was proper. However, the parties 
stipulated that plaintiffs counsel advised the UHP that there was not 
enough evidence to obtain a warrant to open the Christmas gift. (R. 58; 122). 
The trial court ignored these stipulated facts in making its finding that 
Hank Lachman gave consent to his trunk being searched and that the 
warrantless seizure was proper. As discussed above, "courts are bound by 
stipulations between parties." Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528, 536 
(Utah 2000). As the parties have stipulated the trunk was opened and 
searched without Hank Lachman's consent and the proceeds improperly 
seized without a warrant, the trial court's finding that Hank Lachman gave 
consent and the seizure was proper, was clearly erroneous. 
B. HANK LACHMAN DID NOT GIVE CONSENT TO OPEN 
HIS TRUNK AND SEARCH IT, 
The UHP was not entitled to search Mr. Lachman's trunk. Law 
enforcement officials may neither search nor seize unless and until they have 
a warrant supported by probable cause. "Searches and seizures conducted 
without a warrant are 'unreasonable per se unless [they] within a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.'" State v. 
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Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. Bartlev, 784 
P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App. 1989). Specific exceptions to the warrant 
requirement include searches "incident to arrest, searches of moveable 
vehicles, and seizure of clearly incriminating evidence or contraband in plain 
view." Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226 (citins State v. Hugh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 
(Utah 1985)). Likewise, consent to search is a "well-recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement for searches ..." State v. One Hundred Seventy-
Five Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars, U.S. Currency, 942 P.2d 343, 346 
(Utah 1997). 
C. THE UHP HAD NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH 
TRUNK WITHOUT A WARRANT 
Hank Lachman gave no consent to search his trunk. However, even 
assuming that the consent exception applies, the Fourth Amendment "does 
not permit such warrantless activities unless the police have probable cause 
for the ... search." Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226; see also State v. Wright, 977 
P.2d 505, 506 (Utah App. 1999) ("these exceptions are applicable only when 
supported by probable cause." ) A police officer lacks probable cause to 
search a trunk when "he did not find any evidence of drug use in the 
passenger compartment." Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226 (citing United States v. 
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Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993)). Thus, even if Hank Lachman 
gave consent to search the t runk, the UHP Troopers were not entitled to do 
so, as they had no probable cause based upon what was found and what was 
not found, in the passenger compartment. It is undisputed tha t the UPH 
search of the passenger compartment revealed no odor of marijuana, either 
in raw form or smoked, nor did the search find any drug paraphernalia, drug 
manufacturing equipment or any other controlled substance or contraband. 
(R. 56; 122). There was no probable cause at tha t point in time to go any 
further with their search. 
The present case is similar to the 10th Circuit case of United States v. 
Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993), tha t has been adopted by the 
Utah Appellate Courts.2 In Nielsen, a consensual search of the passenger 
compartment occurred. The officer could not find any evidence to 
corroborate suspicion of drug use. The officer indicated tha t he wished to 
look in the trunk, and the defendant twice declined to give consent. Id. at 
1489 n. 1. The officer opened the t runk and discovered controlled substances 
2
 State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Mavcock, 
947 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Wright. 977 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah App. 
1999). 
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and drug paraphernalia. The Tenth Circuit suppressed the evidence 
discovered in the trunk, ruling that the officer lacked probable cause to 
search the trunk because he did not find any evidence of drug use in the 
passenger compartment. Id. at 1491. 
In the present case, Hank Lachman gave the UHP Troopers consent to 
search the passenger compartment of his vehicle. Trooper Ballantyne 
searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. His search of the 
J • '• • 
passenger compartment revealed no odor of marijuana, either in raw form or 
smoked, nor did the search find any drug paraphernalia, drug 
manufacturing equipment or any other controlled substance or contraband. 
Trooper Wilson asked Hank Lachman how to open his trunk and Mr. 
Lachman showed Trooper Wilson where the trunk latch was located. Mr. 
Lachman informed the Troopers and later affirmed this to their superior 
Sargent Haycock, that he did not give them consent to search the trunk. 
Trooper Wilson opened the trunk anyway, a speeding warning was issued, 
the Christmas gift was seized ten days before Christmas and Hank Lachman 
was sent on his way without even being arrested or cited for any violation of 
Utah law minus $73,130. Given these facts, the search of the trunk was 
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done without Hank Lachman's consent, was not supported by probable cause 
and the seizure was performed without probable cause or a warrant. The 
trial court's finding that the search and seizure was proper given these facts 
is clearly erroneous. 
!>• THE SEARCH OF THE TRUNK WITHOUT A WARRANT 
VIOLATED THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
The Utah Constitution not only requires probable cause to search a 
vehicle, but also "exigent circumstances in the context of warrantless 
automobile searches." State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 224 n. 2 (Utah App. 
1995) (Citing State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Mavcock, 947 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah App. 1997) (citins State v. Anderson, 910 
P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1996). "Exigent circumstances exist when the car is 
movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be 
found again if a warrant must be obtained." Mavcock, 947 P.2d at 697-8; 
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1237. No such exigent circumstances exist in this 
case. 
Trooper Wilson called Sargent Haycock and Sargent Haycock called 
Grand County Attorney William Benge to discuss what could be done with 
regards to the Christmas gift. Mr. Benge advised the UHP that there was 
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not enough evidence to obtain a warrant to open the Christmas gift. These 
facts demonstrate that the UHP was able to avail itself to the telephonic 
warrant procedure before opening and searching the trunk, but declined to 
do so. There were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search 
and the trial court's ruling that the search and seizure was proper is clearly 
erroneous and violates the Utah Constitution. 
E. THE UHP IMPERMISSIBLY SEIZED THE CURRENCY 
WITHOUT A WARRANT. 
No warrant was ever requested or granted by the UHP to open the 
Christmas package until seven days after the currency had been deposited 
into a bank account. County Attorney Benge informed the UHP at the time 
of the stop that a warrant would not be granted if one were requested. 
However, the UHP seized the currency anyway and waited seven days to 
obtain a warrant. 
There are four exceptions to when a seizure may be made without 
process. None are applicable to this matter. The first exception is when the 
seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant. Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(i). No arrest of Hank Lachman occurred, nor was the 
search of the vehicle or the package done with a warrant. (R. 56-57; 122). 
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The second exception is when the property has been the subject of a 
prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal proceeding. Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(ii). Again, this has no application. 
The third exception is when the peace officer has probable cause to 
believe that the property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or 
safety. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(iii). Again, this has no application. 
It was stipulated between the parties that Trooper Wilson did not believe 
that there was anything dangerous about the package. (R. 60; 122). Mr. 
Lachman assured Sargent Haycock that there was nothing illegal in the box 
or anything dangerous to his Troopers. (R. 59; 122). Thus, this exception 
had no application. 
The last exception is when "a peace officer has probable cause to 
believe that the property has been used in violation of the chapter and has 
probable cause to believe that the property would be damaged, intentionally 
diminished in value, destroyed, concealed, or removed from the state/' 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(iv). Trooper Wilson obviously did not 
believe that the currency had been used in violation of the controlled 
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substances act, as he gave Mr. Lachman a friendly warning and did nothing 
to stop him after finding out the box contained money. 
Even assuming that Trooper Wilson had probable cause to believe the 
currency had been used in violation of the chapter, he had no probable cause 
to believe that the property would be damaged, intentionally diminished in 
value, destroyed, concealed, or removed from the state. The UHP was in 
possession of the package. It should have obtained judicial authorization 
before opening the package and seizing the money. If, as indicated by 
William Benge to Sargent Haycock, no warrant would issue, the box and its 
contents should have been returned. Thus, the trial court's finding that the 
seizure was proper is clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
F. REMEDY FOR IMPROPER SEARCH AND SEIZURE IS 
RETURN OF CURRENCY 
This Court has been very explicit that when "the statute authorizing 
forfeiture expressly requires certain procedures to be followed in seizing the 
property to be forfeited ... compliance with such requirements is essential to 
enforcement." Davis v. State, 813 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1991) (citation 
omitted). When property is "illegally seized because of the lack of a warrant" 
and the "basis for forfeiture derived from the connection of the ... [property] 
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to the drugs, not because of the possession of the ... [property] was in and of 
itself illegal," the trial court has no jurisdiction to order forfeiture and the 
property must be returned to the claimant, Hank Lachman. Id. 
ISSUE NO, 3 
FORFEITURE IN THIS MATTER VIOLATES EXCESSIVE FINES 
CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS, 
The trial court's ruling acts as a fine of over $73,000 for a simple 
speeding warning. Such a result violates Mr. Lachman's protections against 
excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. 
A civil sanction may be punitive for purposes of the Excessive Fines 
Clause. United States v. Urserv, 518 U.S. 267, 287 (1996); Hudson v. 
United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997). When a case deals with the forfeiture of 
monies, "such cases are examined using solely a proportionality 
determination." State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, Utah, 
994 P.2d 1254, 1257 n. 6 (Utah 2000) (citins United States v. Baiakaiian, 524 
U.S. 321, 329 n. 9 (1997): United States v. $273,969.04 United States 
Currency, 164 F.3d 462, 466 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1999)). "[T]he touchstone of the 
constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of 
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proportionality: The amount... must bear some relationship to the gravity of 
the offense... ." State of Utah v. Truman Mortensen Family Trust, 8 P.3d 
266, 273 (Utah 2000). 
In this case, Hank Lachman was not charged with any crime. He was 
given a friendly warning by the UHP for speeding. The money was not 
traced to any violation of Utah law. The forfeiture of over $73,000 is clearly 
a disproportionate fine for any of Mr. Lachman's actions and violates the 
Excessive Fines Clause. As such, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
order and have the proceeds returned to Mr. Lachman. 
ISSUE NO, 4 
UTAH'S FORFEITURE STATUTE VIOLATES CLAIMANT'S DUE 
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS 
Had Hank Lachman been charged with a crime in this matter, the 
forfeiture proceedings would be "as part of the criminal prosecution as an in 
personam action against the defendant's interest in the property subject to 
forfeiture." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (9)(b). The property could not be 
forfeited unless the state proved claimant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
By failing to charge Mr. Lachman with any crime, the forfeiture statute 
permits the state to forfeit Mr. Lachman's property by proving the civil 
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standard of proof or by a preponderance of the evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-13 (9)(c). 
By failing to charge Mr. Lachman with a crime and send him back to 
California with a UHP friendly warning, the State had a much easier burden 
to meet in claiming Mr. Lachman's money. Such disparate treatment 
between a criminal and Mr. Lachman, who is charged with nothing, violates 
Mr. Lachman's Due Process and Equal Protection Rights under both the 
federal and state constitutions. 
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Condemarin v. University 
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 372 (Utah 1989): 
Article I, section 24 states, "All laws of a general 
nature shall have uniform operation." It extends to 
every person the right to enjoy the equal protection 
of the law. The purpose of that provision, as 
explained in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d at 669, is to 
assure that "persons similarly situated should be 
treated similarly, and persons in different 
circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." "When persons are 
similarly situated, it is unconstitutional to single out 
one person or group of persons from among a larger 
class on the basis of a tenuous justification that has 
little or no merit." Id. at 671. 
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The Utah Forfeiture Statute's differing burdens of proof for a charged 
criminal as opposed to someone not charged with a crime violates Hank 
Lachman's equal protection rights. Thus, this Court should declare it 
unconstitutional and return the proceeds to claimant Hank Lachman. 
ISSUE NO, 5 
CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS PROCEEDS RETURNED 
TO HIM BASED UPON SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE DOCTRINE, 
A key piece of evidence was lost in this matter. The UHP deposited the 
cash into a bank account on December 14, 1999, instead of putting it into 
custodial care pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (5). (R. 61; 122). It 
was deposited prior to a warrant issuing and with the knowledge that the 
County Attorney did not believe that the money was properly seized. The 
actual evidence was lost. 
Because of the unwarranted deposit of the currency, Claimant lost the 
opportunity to prove that any of the controlled substances found on the 
package were a result from being in contact with the currency and not from 
any alleged drug transaction. The money could have easily tainted the 
package materials. However, claimant lost the opportunity to attempt to 
prove such. 
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Claimant's counsel has found no Utah appellate decision that expressly 
adopts the spoliation of evidence doctrine. However, the present case 
warrants such an adoption of the doctrine. Under "the doctrine of'spoliation 
of evidence,' which holds that where a party to an action fails to provide or 
destroys evidence favorable to the opposing party, the court will infer the 
evidence's adverse content." Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 
419 (Utah App. 1994) {citing Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills 
Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 217-18 (1st Cir.1982); National Ass'n of 
Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 557-58 (N.D.Cal.1987)). 
Under that doctrine, "the bad faith destruction of a document relevant to 
proof of an issue at trial gives rise to an inference that production of the 
document would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its 
destruction." Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 631 (D. Utah 
1998) (quoting Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th 
Cir.1997)). See also Turnage, 115 F.R.D. at 557 (f,[w]here one party 
wrongfully denies another the evidence necessary to establish a fact in 
dispute.") 
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There is a presumption that the actual currency would have been 
helpful to claimant's case and that had the claimant had the opportunity to 
have the currency sniffed by a dog and/or examined by an expert witness, it 
would have eliminated any significance that the packaging materials had 
residue on it. The fact that money is tainted does not prove that the money 
was involved in a drug transaction, especially money from the Los Angeles 
area. See United States v. U.S. Currency, $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 
1994) ("If greater than seventy-five percent of all circulated currency in Los 
Angeles is contaminated with drug residue, it is extremely likely a narcotics 
detection dog will positively alert when presented with a large sum of 
currency from that area.") 
Based upon the spoliation of evidence doctrine, plaintiff is entitled to 
have no significance attach to the canine sniff of the packaging. No 
discernable controlled substances were found on the packaging. Claimant 
was left with no opportunity to prove or examine the currency. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah seizure and forfeiture statutes require that the State prove 
that the currency in question was intended to be used in exchange for a 
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controlled substance. The parties stipulated before the trial court that the 
currency was not traceable to any drug transaction. Given the stipulation, 
trial court's judgment that the currency was forfeitable was clearly 
erroneous. 
Morever, the parties stipulated before the trial court that Hank 
Lachman did not give the UHP consent to search his trunk. The UHP had 
no probable cause and no exigent circumstances justified opening the trunk. 
Once the trunk was open, the UHP had no probable cause and no exigent 
circumstances justified seizing the currency. Thus, the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the currency and the currency should be 
returned to claimant. 
If the trial court's order and judgment stands, it acts as a fine of over 
$73,000 to claimant Hank Lachman for a simple speeding warning. Such a 
fine violates Mr. Lachman's protections against excessive fines under the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 9 
of the Utah Constitution. 
Similarly, the differing burdens of proof between an in rem civil 
forfeiture and a forfeiture pursuant to a criminal action, violates claimant's 
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equal protection and due process protections under both the Utah and U.S. 
Constitutions. 
Finally, depositing the currency into a bank account prior to a seizure 
warrant issuing and before the claimant could inspect the currency, 
constitutes spoliation of evidence. As such, claimant is entitled to a 
presumption that the actual currency would have been beneficial to him. 
Given this presumption, the finding by the trial court that forfeiture was 
proper is clearly not justified. 
Given the above arguments and facts, the trial court's amended 
forfeiture order should be reversed and this Court should order the currency 
returned to claimant, with interest and taxable costs. 
DATED thi^fC day of December, 2000. 
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN 
... /PV#£-
Alan W. Mortensen 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
CHAPTER 37. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through End of 2000 General Session 
58-37-13 Property subject to forfeiture --Seizure --Procedure [Effective until 
July 1, 2001]. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Complaint" means a verified civil in rem complaint seeking forfeiture or 
m y criminal information or indictment which contains or is amended to include a 
iemand for forfeiture of a defendant's in personam interest in any property which 
Ls subject to forfeiture. 
(b) "Drug distributing paraphernalia" means any property used or designed to 
oe used in the illegal transportation, storage, shipping, or circulation of a 
controlled substance. Property is considered "designed to be used" for one or 
nore of the above-listed purposes if the property has been altered or modified to 
include a feature or device which would actually promote or conceal a violation 
of this chapter. 
(c) "Drug manufacturing equipment or supplies" includes any illegally 
possessed controlled substance precursor, or any chemical, laboratory equipment, 
Dr laboratory supplies possessed with intent to engage in clandestine laboratory 
operation as defined in Section 58-37d-3. 
(d) "Interest holder" means a secured party as defined in Section 70A-9-
105(1)(m), a mortgagee, lien creditor, or the beneficiary of a security interest 
or encumbrance pertaining to an interest in property, whose interest would be 
perfected against a good faith purchaser for value. A person who holds property 
for the benefit of or as an agent or nominee for another, or who is not in 
substantial compliance with any statute requiring an interest in property to be 
recorded or reflected in public records in order to perfect the interest against 
a good faith purchaser for value, is not an interest holder. 
(e) "Proceeds" means property acquired directly or indirectly from, produced 
through, realized through, or caused by an act or omission and includes any 
property of any kind without reduction for expenses incurred in the acquisition, 
maintenance, or production of that property, or any other purpose. 
(f) "Resolution of criminal charges" occurs at the time a claimant who is 
also charged with violations under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d 
enters a plea, upon return of a jury verdict or court ruling in a criminal trial, 
or upon dismissal of the criminal charge. 
(g) "Violation of this chapter" means any conduct prohibited by Title 58, 
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Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d or any conduct occurring outside the state 
vhich would be a violation of the laws of the place where the conduct occurred 
and which would be a violation of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d if 
:he conduct had occurred in this state. 
(2) The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right exists in 
;hem: 
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, 
dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter; 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or intended 
for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or 
exporting any controlled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property 
described in Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b); 
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not including 
capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for use to 
administer controlled substances in violation of this chapter; 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended 
for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, 
receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described in Subsections 
(2)(a) and (2)(b), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of 
business as a common carrier may not be forfeited under this section unless the 
owner or other person in charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or knew 
or had reason to know of the violation of this chapter; 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason of any 
act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent; 
and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance is subject to the claim of an interest 
holder who did not know or have reason to know after the exercise of reasonable 
diligence that a violation would or did take place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, 
and data used or intended for use in violation of this chapter; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for 
a controlled substance in violation of this chapter, and all moneys, negotiable 
instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any 
violation of this chapter. An interest in property may not be forfeited under 
this subsection unless it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
interest holder knew, had reason to know of, or consented to the conduct which 
made the property subject to forfeiture. The burden of presenting this evidence 
shall be upon the state; 
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in Section 58-37b-2, 
Imitation Controlled Substances Act; 
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real 
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, 
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled substances in 
violation of this chapter, except that: 
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(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or interest 
Ln real property is subject to the claim of an interest holder who did not know 
:>r have reason to know after the exercise of reasonable diligence that a 
violation would take place on the property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if 
:he interest holder did not know or have reason to know of the conduct which made 
:he property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the conduct; 
md 
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or 
nanufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or storage facility 
Dr interest in real property may not be forfeited under this subsection unless 
cumulative sales of controlled substances on the property within a two-month 
period total or exceed $1,000, or the street value of any controlled substances 
Eound on the premises at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics 
Dfficer experienced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify to 
establish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes of this 
subsection; 
(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition carried or used during or in relation 
to a violation of this chapter or any firearm, weapon, or ammunition kept or 
located within the proximity of controlled substances or other property subject 
to forfeiture under this section; and 
(k) all proceeds traceable to any violation of this chapter. There is a 
rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and currency found in proximity to 
forfeitable controlled substances, drug manufacturing equipment or supplies, 
drug distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable records of importation, 
manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances are proceeds traceable to a 
violation of this chapter. The burden of proof is upon the claimant of the 
property to rebut this presumption. 
(3) (a) Property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by any 
peace officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction 
over the property. However, seizure without process may be made when: 
(i) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant or 
an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant; 
(ii) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment 
in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under 
this chapter; 
(iii) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is 
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or 
(iv) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has 
been used or intended to be used in violation of this chapter and has probable 
cause to believe the property will be damaged, intentionally diminished in value, 
destroyed, concealed, or removed from the state. 
(b) Upon the filing of a complaint, the court shall immediately issue to 
the seizing agency a warrant for seizure of any property subject to forfeiture 
which had been seized without a warrant in a manner described in this subsection. 
(4) In the event of seizure under Subsection (3), forfeiture proceedings under 
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Subsection (9) shall be instituted within 90 days of the seizure. The time period 
aay by extended by the court having jurisdiction over the property upon notice to 
ill claimants and interest holders and for good cause shown. 
(5) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in 
:ustody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When 
property is seized under this chapter, the appropriate person or agency may: 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant under 
tfhich it was seized; or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for 
disposition in accordance with law. 
(6) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, 
distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this chapter are 
contraband and no property right shall exist in them. All substances listed in 
Schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state may be 
retained for any evidentiary or investigative purpose, including sampling or 
other preservation prior to disposal or destruction by the state. 
(7) All marijuana or any species of plants from which controlled substances in 
Schedules I and II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation 
of this chapter, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or are wild 
growths, may be seized and retained for any evidentiary or investigative purpose, 
including sampling or other preservation prior to disposal or destruction by the 
state. Failure, upon demand by the department or its authorized agent, of any 
person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which species of 
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof 
that he is the holder of a license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture 
of the plants. 
(8) When any property is forfeited under this chapter by a finding of the court 
that no person is entitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the 
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all property is as follows: 
(a) The state may include in its complaint seeking forfeiture, a request that 
the seizing agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding that the seizing 
agency is able to use the forfeited property in the enforcement of controlled 
substances laws, the court having jurisdiction over the case shall award the 
property to the seizing agency. Each agency shall use the forfeited property for 
controlled substance law enforcement purposes only. Forfeited property or 
proceeds from the sale of forfeited property may not be used to pay any cash 
incentive, award, or bonus to any peace officer or individual acting as an agent 
for the agency, nor may it be used to supplant any ordinary operating expense of 
the agency. The seizing agency shall pay to the prosecuting agency the legal 
costs incurred in filing and pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited 
under this section may not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed 
against any defendant in the case. 
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency, 
bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific property 
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or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the property for use 
in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the payment of costs to the 
county attorney or, if within a prosecution district, the district attorney for 
legal costs for filing and pursuing the forfeiture and upon application for the 
property to the director of the Division of Finance. The application shall 
clearly set forth the need for the property and the use to which the property 
will be put. 
(c) The director of the Division of Finance shall review all applications 
for property submitted under Subsection (8)(b) and, if the seizing agency makes 
no application, make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to 
final disposition and shall notify the designated applicant or seizing agency, 
where no application is made, who may obtain the property upon payment of all 
costs to the appropriate department. The Division of Finance shall in turn 
reimburse the prosecuting agency or agencies for costs of filing and pursuing the 
forfeiture action, not to exceed the amount of the net proceeds received for the 
sale of the property. Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to 
the seizing agency or agencies. 
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection (8)(a) or 
(b), the director of the Division of Finance shall dispose of the property by 
public bidding or as considered appropriate, by destruction. Proof of destruction 
shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the department having charge 
of the property, and verified by the director of the department or his designated 
agent. 
(9) Forfeiture proceedings shall be commenced as follows: 
(a) For actions brought under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(j), a complaint 
shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, 
the district attorney, or the attorney general, and filed in a court of record 
where the property was seized or is to be seized. In cases in which the claimant 
of the property is also charged as a criminal defendant, the complaint shall be 
filed in the county where the criminal charges arose, regardless of the location 
of the property. The complaint shall include: 
(i) a description of the property which is subject to forfeiture; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and 
(iii) the allegations of conduct which gives rise to forfeiture. 
(b) In cases where a claimant is also charged as a criminal defendant, the 
forfeiture shall proceed as part of the criminal prosecution as an in personam 
action against the defendant's interest in the property subject to forfeiture. A 
defendant need not file a written answer to the complaint, but may acknowledge or 
deny interest in the property at the time of first appearance on the criminal 
charges. If a criminal information or indictment is amended to include a demand 
for forfeiture, the defendant may respond to the demand at the time of the 
amendment. 
(i) Unless motion for disposition is made by the defendant, the determination 
of forfeiture shall be stayed until resolution of the criminal charges. Hearing 
on the forfeiture shall be before the court without a jury. The court may 
consider any evidence presented in the criminal case, and receive any other 
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evidence offered by the state or the defendant. The court shall determine by a 
)reponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or 
release of the property as it determines. 
(ii) A defendant may move the court to transfer the forfeiture action, to 
stay all action, including discovery, in the forfeiture, or for hearing on the 
forfeiture any time prior to trial of the criminal charges. Either party may move 
:he court to enter a finding of forfeiture as to defendant's interest in part or 
ill of the property, either by default or by stipulation. Upon entry of a 
finding, the court shall stay the entry of judgment until resolution of the 
:riminal charges. Any finding of forfeiture entered by the court prior to 
resolution of the criminal charges may not constitute a separate judgment, and 
m y motion for disposition, stay, severance, or transfer of the forfeiture action 
nay not create a separate proceeding. Upon the granting of a motion by the 
iefendant for disposition, stay, severance, or transfer of the forfeiture action, 
:he defendant shall be considered to have waived any claim that the defendant has 
Deen twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
(iii) Any other person claiming an interest in property subject to forfeiture 
ander this subsection may not intervene in a trial or appeal of a complaint filed 
jnder this subsection. Following the entry of an in personam forfeiture order, or 
jpon the filing of a petition for release under Subsection (e), the county 
attorney, district attorney, or attorney general may proceed with a separate in 
rem action to resolve any other claims upon the property subject to forfeiture. 
(c) A complaint seeking forfeiture under Subsection (2) (k) shall be prepared 
by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, the district 
attorney, or by the attorney general, either in personam as part of a criminal 
prosecution, or in a separate civil in rem action against the property alleged to 
be proceeds, and filed in the county where the property is seized or encumbered, 
if the proceeds are located outside the state. A finding that property is the 
proceeds of a violation of this chapter does not require proof that the property 
is the proceeds of any particular exchange or transaction. Proof that property is 
proceeds may be shown by evidence which establishes all of the following by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) that the person has engaged in conduct in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) that the property was acquired by the person during that period when the 
conduct in violation of this chapter occurred or within a reasonable time after 
that period; and 
(iii) that there was no likely source for the property other than conduct in 
violation of the chapter. 
(d) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the 
clerk of the court, and served upon all persons known to the county attorney or 
district attorney to have a claim in the property by: 
(i) personal service upon a claimant who is charged in a criminal information 
or indictment; and 
(ii) certified mail to each claimant whose name and address is known or to 
each owner whose right, title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor 
Vehicles to the address given upon the records of the division, which service is 
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:onsidered complete even though the mail is refused or cannot be forwarded. The 
:ounty attorney, district attorney, or attorney general shall make one 
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure 
vas made for all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are 
Delieved to have an interest in the property. 
(e) Except under Subsection (9)(a) in personam actions, any claimant or 
interest holder shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint 
within 2 0 days after service. When property is seized under this chapter, any 
Interest holder or claimant of the property, prior to being served with a 
complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court having 
jurisdiction for release of his interest in the property. The petition shall 
specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to have it 
released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney or, if within a 
prosecution district, the district attorney in the county of the seizure, who 
shall answer the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a 
complaint of forfeiture. 
(f) For civil actions in rem, after 20 days following service of a complaint 
or petition for release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer is 
Dn file, the court shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to 
present evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the 
property as the court determines. If the county attorney or district attorney has 
not filed an answer to a petition for release and the court determines from the 
evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it 
shall enter an order directing the county attorney or district attorney to answer 
the petition within ten days. If no answer is filed within that period, the court 
shall order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the end of 
2 0 days, the court shall set the matter for hearing. At this hearing all 
interested parties may present evidence of their rights of release of the 
property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court shall determine 
by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or 
release of the property as it determines. 
(h) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the property in 
whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited. 
(i) When the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not 
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper 
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture and 
release in part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. When the 
property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release, the court shall 
order it sold and the proceeds distributed: 
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants; 
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, storage of 
the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture, and costs of 
sale; and 
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the General Fund. 
(j) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in whole 
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DT in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding, 
including seizure and storage of the property, against the individual or 
individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may assess costs 
against any other claimant or claimants to the property as appropriate. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-13 
UT ST § 58-37-13 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Amendment IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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Amendment VIII. 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted. 
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Amendment XIV*** 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in 
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
/ enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws. 
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Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
1896 
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Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.l 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; 
nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned 
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
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Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 24. 
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Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
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MAR 2 3 2000 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
THE SEVENTH DISTRICT .JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR 'GKRmrT^W^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
SEVENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE 
HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS, 




Case No. 9907-207 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
This case was heard on February 24, 2000. The court first 
addressed the question whether the answer of claimant Hank 
Lachman ("Lachman") was timely and whether the court would 
enlarge the time for answering. 
It appears from the record that- the complaint and notice of 
seizure for the forfeiture were mailed to Lachman as the statue 
requires on December 21, 1999. Section 58-37-13(9) (e) , Utah Code 
Annotated (1998) requires that the answer be filed within twenty 
days after service. Rule 5(b)(1)(B), U.R.C.P., provides that 
service is complete upon mailing. Rule 6(e), U.R.C.P., provides 
that whenever a party is required to do some act within a 
prescribed period after the service of a paper upon him, and 
service is by mailing, three days are added to the prescribed 
period. Accordingly, Lachman's answer must have been filed by 
1 
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January 13, 3000. Lachman did not file his answer until January 
26, 2000, thirteen days late. 
Lachman maintains that he did not receive the complaint 
until January 4, 2000. Lachman has not offered any explanation 
for why it would have taken from December 21, 19 99, to January 4, 
2000, for him to receive the mailed complaint. It was mailed by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, so perhaps Lachman 
elected not to pick up the mail until January 4, 2000. Since 
Lachman has not presented the actual envelope in which the 
complaint was delivered, the court has no way of attributing this 
delay to Lachman or to the U. S. Postal Service. In any event, 
Lachman received the complaint nine days before the filing 
deadline. 
It is fairly routine for the court to grant extensions of 
time to answer complaints in civil cases if the delay is a matter 
of a few days and appears to be due to inadvertence of counsel. 
There is no inadvertence of counsel here. Lachman did not 
deliver the complaint to his counsel until January 22 or 23, 
2000, long after the deadline had passed. The delay of thirteen 
days is more substantial than the usual delay, and Lachman has 
not presented any evidence assigning any responsibility to the 
mail carrier. 
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In most cases, the equities favor permitting the defendant 
to assert his defenses so that the case can be resolved on the 
merits. Here, there is significant evidence of lack of good 
faith on Lachman's part. He denied any knowledge about or 
ownership of the defendant currency when it was taken on December 
14, 1999, but now unabashedly asserts that he did know what it 
was and that it belongs to him. The law should not favor playing 
these kinds of games with the truth. 
Lachman's motion for enlargement of time is denied and the 
court proceeds on the basis that the answer is not timely and 
should not be considered. • .-. 
Notwithstanding this determination, the court must still 
make a finding that the currency is forfeitable. Otherwise, it 
would presumably be turned over to the State of Utah as unclaimed 
property. In addition, should Lachman elect to appeal the denial 
of his motion, final resolution of this matter would be expedited 
by trial court consideration of the merits of the underlying 
claim. Lachman and the State agreed that the court can decide 
whether the currency should be forfeited based upon the materials 
submitted by Lachman with his motion for summary judgment, with 
additional facts stipulated at the February 24, 2000, hearing. 
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From those materials and the stipulated facts, the court finds as 
follows: 
1. Lachman was stopped on 1-70 eastbound for speeding on 
December 13, 1999, by Trooper Ken Ballantyne. He was traveling 
from Los Angeles, California, to Denver, Colorado, in a car 
rented by a Sam Scott ("Scott"). Lachman was an authorized 
driver, but reported that Scott had been unable to make the trip 
because his wife had a baby. Lachman appeared to be talking to 
himself while Trooper Ballantyne was writing the ticket. The car 
had white skis with old style bindings and a black bag on the 
back seat. 
2. On December 14, 1999, Trooper Keith Wilson stopped Lachman 
for speeding on the same road five miles west of where he had 
been stopped the day before. Lachman was westbound. Trooper 
Wilson ran a check on Lachman's license and found that Lachman 
had been arrested for a drug offense. Lachman again appeared to 
be talking to himself. Lachman explained the absence of Scott as 
he had done the day before, then explained that he had gone to 
Denver to see his girlfriend, but had fought with her and decided 
to go back home. He told the officer that he had known her for 
about a month and that her name was Diana Bloan. 
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3. Trooper Wilson asked Lachman if he had anything illegal in 
the vehicle. Lachman answered that he did not and offered to 
allow the trooper to look. When the trooper asked how to open the 
trunk, Lachman told him how. Lachman did not assert that his 
consent had extended only to the passenger compartment. The 
trunk contained a box wrapped in Christmas wrapping paper. There 
was also a strong air freshener odor in the trunk. 
4. Lachman was asked what was in the package. He answered that 
his friend had bought a gift for Lachman's girlfriend, and asked 
Lachman to deliver the gift. Lachman denied knowing what the 
gift was and said that he had decided not to deliver it because 
of the fight with his girlfriend. 
5. Lachman continued to pay particular attention to the 
Christmas package. When asked for the girlfriend's name again, 
he stated that it was Diana Blanch. He was asked if he would 
open the package, but declined to do so. When asked for a 
receipt for his stay in Denver, he presented a November 16, 1999, 
receipt, and said he had been there a month earlier. Lachman 
also stated at this time that he, Scott, and Diana had known each 
other for ten to fifteen years, even though he had earlier stated 
that he had known Diana for only a month. 
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6. Troopers Wilson and Ballantyne consulted with each other, and 
by phone with Sergeant Rich Haycock. Haycock said he would speak 
with the county attorney and call back. When Haycock called 
back, he eventually spoke directly with Lachman. Haycock told 
Lachman that the police concern focused on the package and that 
there was no need to delay Lachman further if he would let the 
police take possession of the package. Lachman asked for a 
receipt. Lachman repeatedly asserted that the package was not 
his and that he knew nothing about it, except that Scott had 
asked him to give it to Lachman's girlfriend. 
7. Trooper Wilson partially opened the package at the scene 
after Lachman had departed with his receipt. When he observed 
the currency, he closed the package and brought it to Moab. 
8. The currency inside the package and the wrapper in which the 
currency was packaged were both subjected to independent sniff 
tests by a certified drug dog. The dog alerted to the odor of 
drugs on both the wrapper and the currency. However, no 
measurable amount of any controlled substance was found on either 
the currency or the wrapper. 
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9. Lachman now asserts that he is the owner of the currency, 
that he knew the currency was in the package, and that he had 
placed it there for safekeeping. 
ANALYSIS 
Property is forfeitable under Section 58-37-13, Utah code 
Annotated (1998), if it is furnished or intended to be furnished 
in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of Utah Law, 
or where the actual or intended exchange would violate Utah law 
if it were to occur in Utah. The state must establish this by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
The court is persuaded that the defendant currency was 
received in exchange for a controlled substance, or intended to 
be exchanged for a controlled substance. The facts set forth 
above persuade the court that Lachman brought the currency back 
from Denver on December 14, 1999, in exchange for drugs delivered 
on December 13, 1999, or as an advance payment on a shipment to 
occur at a later date. Any innocent explanation of the facts is 
too far fetched to believe. 
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Lachman asserts that seizure of the package without a 
warrant bars forfeiture. The police did obtain a seizure warrant 
on December 21, 1999. Some delay between taking possession of 
the vehicle contents and obtaining a warrant is to be expected. 
Moreover, the package was surrendered to the police by Lachman at 
a time when he claimed no interest in it. Lachman has cited no 
authority supporting his position that property may not be 
forfeited if a seizure warrant is issued after the police 
exercise control over the property. Such a requirement would not 
be reasonable for property in a vehicle traveling on freeways in 
remote corners of Utah. 
Lachman also asserts that the police lacked authority to 
open the trunk and open the package. Lachman's consent to look 
in the vehicle extended to opening the trunk. These claims are 
also rejected because they only affect what evidence the court 
can consider; they do not operate as a complete bar to 
forfeiture. Lachman did not seek to suppress any evidence on the 
theory that it had been gathered in violation of his rights. 
Finally, Lachman claims that forfeiture violates the 
excessive fines clause of the U.S. Constitution. Where currency 
is clearly the product of illegal drug sales, this issue was 
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resolved in State v. $175,800, 942 P. 2d 343 (Utah 1997). That 
is the case here. 
Counsel for plaintiff should submit a formal judgment of 
forfeiture pursuant to Rule 4-504. 
Dated this 2^^J^ day of March, 2000. 
Lyl£^£. Anderson, District Judge 
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Alan W. Mortensen (A6616) 
MORTENSEN & LUNCEFORD 
371 North 200 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801)294-2318 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND CLAIMANT 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SEVENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE 
HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS, 
(573,130.00) UNITED STATES 
CURRENCY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER TO VACATE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT, DENYING DEFENDANT 
AND CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
AMENDED FORFEITURE ORDER 
Civil No. 9907-207 
Judge Anderson 
The above entitled matter came before 'he Court on May 17, 2000. before the Honorable 
Lyle R. Anderson to hear the Claimant's motions to vacate the default judgment entered by the 
Court on February 23, 2000, and to amend the forfeiture order entered on April 5, 2000. 
I. DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
With regards to claimant's motion to vacate the default judgment entered against 
claimant, based upon the newly discovered evidence as set forth in the facts in the Memorandum 
*£VENTr DtSTRJCT COcr 
\i73:~r County 
"ILED I! !*j fi Z n-r.r 
CLERK Or THE COURT 
BY 
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of Points and Authorities in Support of Claimant's Motion for Relief of Default Judgment, 
coupled with plaintiff stipulating at the hearing to the granting claimant's motion to vacate the 
default judgment, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the default judgment entered against 
claimant is hereby vacated and claimant's answer shall be considered. 
II. AMENDED FORFEITURE ORDER 
With regards to claimant's motion to amend the April 5, 2000 forfeiture order, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED THAT the forfeiture order shall be amended, as follows: 
This matter having come before the Court for hearing on February 23, 2000, before the 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, and the Court heard the matter and issued a Memorandum 
Decision, incorporated herein, THE COURT HEREBY FINDS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The search of claimant Hank Lachman's trunk by the Utah Highway Patrol 
Officers was done with Mr. Lachman's consent and the seizure of the money in his trunk was 
proper. 
2. Depositing the seized money into a bank account did not constitute spoliation of 
evidence. 
3. The Utah Forfeiture Statute does not violate claimant Hank Lachman's equal 
protection, due process and/or excessive fines protections under the Utah and/or United States 
Constitutions. 
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4. The United States currency described herein had been or was intended to be used 
by claimant Hank Lachman in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of the laws of the 
state of Utah. 
Based upon these findings, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary 
judgment filed by claimant is denied and the United States Currency described herein is hereby 
forfeited to the State of Utah, the seizing agency, to be used in its enforcement of Utah's 
controlled substance laws. 
DATED t h i s - ^ day of ) 1/r\iL , 2000. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of May, 2000, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed via US MAIL, postage prepaid, to: 
William L. Benge 
GRAND COUNTY ATTORNEY 
125 East Center Street 
Moab, Utah 84532 
By 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Defendant, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of C.J.A., hereby provides the following statement of 
undisputed facts, which demonstrate that Defendant and claimant Hank D. Lachman, are entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
1. On or about December 13, 1999, claimant Hank D. Lachman was stopped and 
cited by Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Ken Ballantyne for speeding while traveling from his 
home in Los Angeles, California to Denver, Colorado on 1-70. See Statement of Ballantyne at p. 
11 of Wilson deposition Exhibit 6, attached hereto as Exhibit A. Trooper Ballantyne did not 
search the vehicle or the trunk at that time. Id. 
2. The next afternoon, on December 14, 1999, Mr. Lachman was pulled over for 
speeding by Trooper Keith Wilson on 1-70 in Grand County while heading back to California. 
3. Mr. Lachman did not in any manner try to evade Trooper Wilson and was 
compliant in slowing down and pulling over when Trooper Wilson turned on his lights. See 
Lachman deposition, attached hereto as Exhibit B, at p. 7, Wilson deposition at video clip 12, 
attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
4. Mr. Lachman had a valid California driver's license. Lachman depo. at p. 7, 
Wilson statement at p. 2 of Wilson deposition Exhibit 6, attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
5. Mr. Lachman was driving a rental car from Budget Rental car and was an 
authorized driver of the car. See Budget Information, attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
6. Shortly after Mr. Lachman was pulled over, Trooper Ballantyne showed up and 
pulled along side Trooper Wilson's vehicle. 
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7. Trooper Wilson believed that Mr. Lachman was acting very nervous and that his 
behavior was evidence that Mr. Lachman was under the influence of drugs. See Wilson 
Statement at p. 2. 
8. Trooper Wilson's vehicle had no video camera inside of it. Trooper Ballantyne's 
vehicle was equipped with a video camera that is programed to turn on when his lights are turned 
on. See Wilson depo. at clip 1. 
9. Trooper Wilson asked if they could search the vehicle. Mr. Lachman gave them 
consent to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle. See Lachman depo. at p. 14, 
Ballantyne Statement at p. 12. 
10. Trooper Wilson interpreted Mr. Lachman's consent to search the passenger 
compartment to include the trunk and made no distinction between searching the passenger 
compartment and the trunk. See Wilson depo. at clip 13. 
11. Trooper Ballantyne searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. His 
search of the passenger compartment revealed no odor of marijuana, either in raw form or 
smoked, nor did the search find any drug paraphernalia, drug manufacturing equipment or any 
other controlled substance or contraband. See Lachman depo. at pp. 15-16, Wilson depo. at clip 
2. 
12. Trooper Wilson asked Hank Lachman how to open his trunk and Mr. Lachman 
showed Trooper Wilson where the trunk latch was located. See Lachman depo. at p. 16 
13. Trooper Wilson asked Mr. Lachman if he could search his trunk and Mr. Lachman 
informed the Troopers and their superior Sargent Haycock, that he did not give them consent to 
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search the trunk. See Lachman depo. at p. 16; Ballantyne Statement at pp. 13-14; Haycock 
Statement at p. 16, attached hereto as Exhibit F. 
14. Trooper Wilson opened the trunk anyway. See Lachman depo. at p. 17. 
15. The Utah Highway Patrol Troopers did not at any time obtain a warrant to search 
the vehicle, nor did they have a drug sniffing canine. See Lachman depo. at p. 16; Wilson depo. 
at clip 15. 
16. In the trunk was located a suit case, which Trooper Wilson searched without the 
consent of Mr. Lachman and without a warrant or a search dog. See Lachman depo. at p. 20. 
17. In the suitcase, Trooper Wilson located some cigarette papers. See Lachman 
depo. at p. 22, Wilson Statement at p. 3. 
18. Hank Lachman is a smoker and rolls his own cigarettes and informed the UHP 
Troopers of such. See Lachman depo. at p. 22, Wilson Statement at p. 3. 
19. The cigarette papers were not seized by Trooper Wilson, nor were they considered 
to be drug paraphernalia or contraband. See Lachman depo. at p. 22; Wilson depo. at clip 3. 
20. Located in the trunk was also a Christmas package. See Lachman depo. at p. 23. 
21. There was no drug paraphernalia, drug manufacturing equipment, narcotics, 
controlled substances or smell of marijuana in the trunk. See Lachman depo. at pp. 24-25; 
Wilson depo. at clip 4. 
22. Finally, after the search of the vehicle had been conducted, Trooper Ballantyne 
turned on his video camera. See Wilson depo. at clip 5. 
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23. At this point in time, Trooper Wilson called Sargent Haycock and Sargent 
Haycock called Grand County Attorney William Benge to discuss what could be done with 
regards to the Christmas gift. Mr. Benge advised the UHP that there was not enough evidence to 
obtain a warrant to open the Christmas gift. See Wilson statement at p. 4. 
24. Mr. Lachman apparently initially denied any knowledge of the contents of the 
box. See Wilson statement at p. 3; Ballantyne statement at p. 13; Haycock Statement at p. 15. 
25. Trooper Wilson asked Mr. Lachman if he would open the package or if they could 
open the package. Mr. Lachman told the Troopers that he would not open the package and he 
did not consent to it being opened. See Lachman depo. at p. 25; Ballantyne Statement at p. 13; 
Haycock Statement at p. 16. 
26. Sargent Haycock spoke with Mr. Lachman via cell phone and told him that if he 
would leave the package with the Troopers, that he would then be free to leave. See Haycock 
Statement at p. 16. • 
27. Mr. Lachman agreed to leave the package with the Troopers as long as he received 
a property receipt from them that was signed by Mr. Lachman, Trooper Wilson and Trooper 
Ballantyne. See Property Receipt, attached hereto as Exhibit G; Ballantyne Statement at p. 13; 
Haycock Statement at p. 15. 
28. Once Mr. Lachman was assured of having a property receipt for the package, his 
nervousness ended and he calmed down significantly. See Wilson depo. at clip 6. 
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29. Hank Lachman did know the contents of the box. He assured Sargent Haycock 
that there was nothing illegal in the box or anything dangerous to his troopers. See Haycock 
Statement at p. 15. 
30. Mr. Lachman was extremely nervous about having so much cash on hand and 
placed it in a Christmas box for "safety purposes." See Lachman depo. at p. 27. 
31. Mr. Lachman knew that there was no controlled substances, no drug 
manufacturing equipment and no drug paraphernalia in the box. See Lachman depo. at p. 27. 
32. Once Mr. Lachman received the assurance that he would get a receipt, he felt 
comfortable that he would get the package back later. See Lachman depo. at p. 27. 
33. The receipt that was given to Hank Lachman lists Hank Lachman as the subject of 
the package. See Receipt, attached hereto as Exhibit G. 
34. The receipt maintained in the UHP files names Sam Scott as the owner of the 
package. See Receipt, attached hereto as Exhibit H. 
35. Even though Trooper Wilson originally believed that Mr. Lachman was under the 
influence of drugs or had something illegal in his car, Hank Lachman was not arrested for any 
violation of Utah law or otherwise given a traffic citation, but rather was given a "friendly 
contact" warning notice and was sent on his way home. See Warning, attached hereto as Exhibit 
I. 
36. During the seizure procedure, Trooper Wilson placed the package into his trunk 
without wrapping it or otherwise protecting it from becoming corrupted by any drug residue that 
may be in his trunk. See Wilson depo. at clip 7. 
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37. Trooper Wilson did not believe that there was anything dangerous about the 
package. See Wilson depo. at clip 17. 
38. After Mr. Lachman drove off, Trooper Wilson took the package out of his trunk 
and opened it without a search warrant and observed that the package was filled with money. See 
Wilson depo. at clip 9. 
39. After observing that the package was filled with money, Trooper Wilson did not 
pursue Mr. Lachman. See Wilson depo. at clip 8. 
40. Trooper Wilson took the package and its contents back to the Moab UHP Post and 
opened the package and removed the contents with Sargent Haycock, without obtaining a search 
warrant. See Wilson depo. at clip 9; Haycock Statement at p. 16. 
41. The package contained $73,130 in cash. 
42. Trooper Wilson testified that it is not illegal to carry cash on one's person. See 
Wilson depo. at clip 16. 
43. Trooper Wilson and Sargent Haycock found no detectable, collectable or 
forfeitable controlled substances on the currency or in the package materials. See Wilson depo. 
at clip 10. 
44. The currency was deposited into First Security Bank on the evening of December 
14, 1999. Haycock Statement at p. 16; Deposit Receipt, attached hereto as Exhibit J. 
45. Two days later on December 16, 1999, two dogs alerted to the odor of narcotics 
on the packaging materials. However, the amount or type of controlled substances that may have 
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been sniffed by the dogs are not quantifiable or identifiable. See Canine Report, attached hereto 
as Exhibit K. 
46. The currency that was seized and which is sought to be forfeited in this case has 
not been traced to any drug transaction in or out of the state of Utah. See Wilson depo. at clip 11. 
47. The complaint filed in this matter was served via certified mail upon Hank 
Lachman and Sam Scott, the person who Mr. Lachman claimed was the owner of the package 
until Mr. Lachman was given a receipt for the package. 
48. Mr. Lachman is the only person who filed a verified answer in this matter. 
49. The only property that is being sought for forfeiture is the currency. The State of 
Utah is not attempting to seize and forfeit any of the alleged traces of any controlled substance 
that was allegedly found on the packaging materials. See Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
1. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Averett v. Grange. 909 P.2d 246, 248 
(Utah 1996). As stated below, there are no set of facts, disputed or otherwise, that can support 
judgment for the plaintiff in this matter. Thus, summary judgment should be granted. 
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Alan W. Mortensen(A6616) f* 
MORTENSEN & LUNCEFORD v 
371 North 200 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801)294-2318 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SEVENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE 
HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS, 
($73,130.00) UNITED STATES 
CURRENCY, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION BETWEEN PLAINTIFF 
AND DEFENDANT AND CLAIMANT 
HANKLACHMAN 
Civil No. 9907-207 
Judge Anderson 
Plaintiff, by and through counsel of record and defendant and claimant Hank D. 
Lachman, by and through counsel of record, based upon an oral stipulation made at the forfeiture 
hearing on February 23, 2000, hereby stipulate as follows: 
1. The facts 1 through 49 presented in the Defendant's and Claimant's "Statement of 
Undisputed Facts" contained in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Defendant's and Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment are true, accurate and undisputed by 
all parties. 
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2. It is likewise true, accurate and undisputed by all parties that on December 16, 
1999, two drug dogs alerted to an odor of controlled substances on the packaging that contained 
the $73,130.00, though no discemable controlled substance was found on the packaging. 
DATED thisT^aay of March, 2000. 
MORTENSEN & LUNCEFORD 
Alan W. Mortensen, attorney for defendant and 
claimant Hank D. Lachman 
DATED this _ day of March, 2000. 
GRAND COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
plaintiff State of 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _[_/_ day of March, 2000, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, via federal express overnight, postage prepaid, to: 
William L. Benge 
GRAND COUNTY ATTORNEY 
125 East Center Street 
Moab, Utah 84532 
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APPENDIX L: 
Property Receipt 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 


























Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX M: 
"Friendly" Warning Notice 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P T\ 





OMT n » - i f : oos \ *s z "CI 
WARNING NOTICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL 
| ;FiqfiTl 
;Wi<L fl-id-n i IT 
, VEHIC TYPET 
2JP 
3TATT 
ii J ***T VEHICXS MA<C 
z*y 
1I5 is not a aummons to appear In Court, 
is a friendly contact by the Highway 
itro* regarding improper drMng or Uie 
echanicaJ condition of your vehicle. Tha 
igftway Patrol requetts your cooperation 
decreasing the number of motor vehicle 
radents by obeying all traffic regulations 






 DATE, TIME 4 LOCATION OF OCCURENCE 
T-" 'A (• - I 
• • *"" * — ' " V U I U T V T \_»~w i l 




Q \nx»onq trtflv: 
D **r* of wtr 
Z Fdowiog inr dDM*/ 
Z D^»irg on w*jng *<f 
Z C*OU dhri3#/ of N n t ' 
3 imorooer ottanc 
- VIOLATIONS -
C3 lmorop#r tumrg 
f? Farf to Hop - U71 cr fcgn: 
C P*< to rep - 't*»«tf ny\* 
CF*IIOooey scnooiOil «^*a 
Z F«*10 oi- t^tt 
10ai»ctvt D'Uti 
3 FfOctt' <m \%ot*3on 
C Impropfjr tarxn; 
C LifMi • *+**> m *** 
Z Iquftrum 
C Paring 
C 0"*t4», *OU*or 
G Untune fUT^ wty 
5RT Y^TT? ^ ^ 6ACGE 5> •»fjrar " V 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
